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Wage Inequality of U.S. Truck Drivers 
 
Using CPS data for the period 1979-2009, the wage dispersion of truck drivers (and subsets 
of the truck driving sample) is compared to the trends in wage dispersion of males economy-
wide. We find that truckers’ wages experienced a decrease in inequality post-deregulation, as 
expected given the literature on regulation’s impact on the labor market. We also find that the 
wage dispersion for truckers is markedly different from males economy-wide, providing 
evidence that the wage distribution of truck drivers has been dominated by the changing 
structure of the occupation post-deregulation and largely immune to the factors that 
increased inequality for the aggregate labor market. 
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I.  Introduction 
There has been a well-documented change in the U.S. wage structure during the last 30 
years. Early research on this topic focused on a wide variety of possible causes of wage 
inequality, such as decreases in union coverage, international trade, and immigration (for a 
summary see Levy and Murnane 1992). In general, the likely causes can be categorized into 
market factors (shifts in labor supply and/or demand) and institutional factors (changes in the 
minimum wage). While some research shows that institutional factors and changes in labor 
supply played a role in changing the wage structure  (Card and DiNardo 2002 and Goldin and 
Katz 2008), other research concludes that any complete explanation of the increase in wage 
inequality should account for an increase in the relative demand for skilled versus unskilled labor 
(Autor et al. 2008).The main explanation forwarded in this literature is skill-biased technological 
change (SBTC). While early research typically portrayed SBTC as having a monotonic effect on 
relative skill demand (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993, Autor et al. 1998 and Katz et al. 1999), 
recent work by Autor et al. (2003) and Autor and Dorn (2008) provides evidence that the impact 
of SBTC differs by occupation, based on the set of tasks a worker performs. Moretti (2008) also 
shows that the demand shocks that lead to increases in inequality seem to be locally concentrated 
in select urban areas. 
Autor et al. (2003) and Autor and Dorn (2008) both model SBTC  affecting high-skilled 
vs. low-skilled workers through the tasks they perform. Both papers take as a starting point the 
fact that the price of computer equipment has fallen tremendously over the last 30 years. The 
former paper enumerates two tasks, abstract and routine, and assumes that computers are perfect 
substitutes for routine tasks.  Autor and Dorn (2008) extend this model and include manual tasks 
in their model that cannot be substituted with computers. In both papers the drop in the price of   3 
computer equipment and the ensuing substitution of computers for performing routine tasks lead 
to lower wages and employment of those (low-skilled) workers that compete with computers. 
However, these models posit an ambiguous relationship between computerization and the wages 
of workers in occupations for which computers cannot be easily substituted, as the relative 
magnitude of the shifts in labor supply and demand are unknown. Therefore, one must gain 
insight empirically. This paper aims to fill part of this void by investigating the evolution of 
wage inequality for U.S. truck drivers. Trucking services have arguably not experienced a vast 
amount of technological change and, so far, truck driving cannot be performed by a computer. 
Technological change in the trucking sector has largely been confined to trucking firms’ 
adoption of technologies to monitor fleets, facilitate communication with drivers, and improve 
logistics (Baker and Hubbard 2004). Both technologies would be expected to compress wages 
due to lower skill requirements. The job of driving the truck itself has not undergone vast 
changes.  
Unrelated to SBTC, documenting the development of wage inequality for truck drivers is 
interesting in its own right because, like other modes of transportation, the trucking sector 
underwent an episode of considerable institutional change during the period that also marks the 
beginning of the economy-wide change in wage inequality. Beginning in the 1970s interstate 
trucking was deregulated, leading to an enormous change in industry structure and an 
accompanying decrease in union density. 
In this paper we analyze the change in the wage inequality for U.S. truck drivers over the 
period 1979-2009. Using Current Population Survey data, we compare and contrast the 
economy-wide changes in wage inequality with those of truck drivers. We also examine the 
effect of institutional factors, namely the real value of the federal minimum wage and   4 
unionization, on wage inequality. We find that the evolution of wage inequality for truck drivers 
is quite different from the rest of the economy and that, over the period in question, truck driver 
wage inequality stabilized and, in some cases, actually decreased. We also find that the real value 
of the minimum wage and the degree of union coverage can only explain part of the changes in 
wage inequality. 
 
II.  A Brief History of Trucking 
  Our interest in examining wage inequality for truck drivers stems from three facts: first, it 
is a very large occupation (roughly three percent of all employed males); second, there is little 
reason to believe that SBTC has substantially altered the structure of this labor market; third, 
truck driving is an occupation that, post-deregulation, experienced substantial real wage declines 
concurrent with considerable employment growth. 
  Most research on trucking labor markets attributed the wage decline to the  deregulation 
of trucking in the late 1970s (Rose 1987; Hirsch 1988; Hirsch and Macpherson 1998).  Trucking 
was regulated by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, which restricted entry onto trucking routes and 
established rate bureaus, leading to rate setting, with prices in excess of marginal cost.  The 
decrease in market competition resulted in regulatory rents which appeared to have been shared 
by firms and labor, especially those drivers who were covered by Teamster collective bargaining 
agreements (Alexis 1998).   
  Though most of the restrictions were imposed on “for-hire” trucking firms (firms that 
offer trucking services as their primary business; also referred to as the trucking industry), the 
regulations also affected private carriage operations within firms (firms that haul their own   5 
freight).  Under regulation, private carriers were only allowed to haul their own freight and could 
not arrange back hauls or contract out trucking services. 
  Deregulation of interstate trucking began administratively in the 1970s with loosening 
entry restrictions and was enacted officially with the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.  There was 
considerable upheaval in trucking, characterized by bankruptcy of incumbent firms and entry of 
new, often small, for-hire firms.  Not surprisingly, the end of regulatory rents resulted in a loss of 
union power and union density; union membership fell from 55 to 25% among firms that 
provided trucking services as their core business (Hirsch and Macpherson 1998).Though the 
Teamsters still have a presence in trucking, they largely retreated into specialized segments of 
the market, such as auto hauling and less-than-truckload operations.   
  Wages declined substantially, though these wage declines differed by segment of the 
market.  Regression analysis by Belzer (1995) suggests that deregulation reduced hourly 
earnings by approximately 28.6%.  Hirsch (1988) finds that deregulation had little effect on the 
earnings of non-union drivers, but reduced union drivers’ earnings by 12% relative to non-union 
drivers. Hirsch and Macpherson (1998) find that deregulation reduced wages in the for-hire 
sector by 15% and attribute this to declining union wage premiums.  
  These studies focus on the period prior to deregulation as well as a limited period post-
deregulation (typically spanning 1973-early 1990s).  In our study, we focus exclusively on the 
post-deregulation period.  Given that deregulation had different impacts on different segments of 
the truck driving labor force, it is interesting to examine the trends in wage inequality in the new, 
highly competitive labor market, characterized by an absence of skill-biased technological 
change. This post-deregulation period is also characterized by the largest changes in the 
economy-wide wage structure.   6 
 
III. Within-Occupation Wage Inequality and the Trucking Labor Market  
  Skill-biased technological change in itself is too coarse a measure to provide a complete 
account of wage inequality in a specific occupation. Therefore, this section discusses possible 
sources of within-group occupational wage inequality in general and relates them to the labor 
market for truck drivers. The sources of within-occupation inequality documented in the 
literature are trade, industry structure, regulatory regime, managerial strategy, increased 
occupational migration, minimum wages and union density. 
   While an increased volume or changed pattern of trade could, certeris paribus, raise 
wages it would have to impact different sub-groups of drivers differently to cause changes in 
occupational wage inequality. However, in the current context, trade is unlikely to be important. 
One can think of the labor market for drivers as three segments: national, regional, and local 
based upon the type of services one’s employer provides.  National carriers generally provide 
services at all three levels.  If trade patterns were to change (eg. higher levels of West Coast trade 
versus East Coast trade) the type of long haul services would also change (eg. more services 
between LA and Chicago and less from NY to Chicago), however the type of driver needed 
would not.  The movement of goods into the US from an ocean port via truck generally requires 
a short dray before the freight is moved to the existing domestic network.  Thus, increased trade 
volumes would merely require more drivers (but not an inherent change in the types of drivers 
needed) and changed trade patterns would result in more long haul drivers needed in one region 
versus another.  However, since the labor market for long-haul drivers is national (with drivers 
serving all 48 contiguous states) there would be no resulting regional wage changes that would 
drive wage differentials within the occupation.   7 
  Changes in within-occupation inequality may also be caused by changes in industry 
structure and regulatory regime.  As discussed in section II, while economic deregulation caused 
considerable industry upheaval, these changes were felt almost immediately after the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980. Moore (1986) reports the number of trucking carriers, relatively stable 
throughout the 1970s at roughly 16,000, increased from 17,083 in 1979 to 25,722 in 1982.  By 
examining trends in inequality over time, we can assess the contribution of changes in industry 
structure due to the change in regulatory regime.  However, this is likely to have caused a change 
in wage structure fairly quickly after deregulation and not likely to be the cause of changed 
inequality after the late-1980s. 
  A similar conclusion is likely to be reached with respect to managerial strategy.  In fact, 
regulation, industry structure and managerial strategies are likely highly conflated in trucking.  
As was discussed in Section II, the period immediately after deregulation saw both consolidation 
of large firms and the entry of numerous small firms.  Thus, the variance in firm size increased 
after deregulation, which may result in wage dispersion driven by managerial strategies, 
assuming that small and large firms have systematically different strategies.  It is entirely 
possible that firms within the same industry react differently to a technological impetus by 
upgrading or deskilling an occupation. Hunter et al. (2001) show that the revolution in 
information technology had a non-uniform impact on skill content of bank tellers. Interesting 
here is that both banks basically had the same goal (customer segregation) but pursued it 
differently leading to increased inequality within the occupation. 
  In trucking, an example of this is the increased use of technology beginning in the late 
1990s that facilitated both truck monitoring and communication between driver and firm.  This 
technology was first adopted by large carriers (not surprising given the economies of scale from   8 
this type of technology).  Unfortunately, our data set does not have information on firm size.  
However, this technological change is also unlikely to have caused systematic changes in wage 
inequality.  If this technology is productivity improving, the productivity gains are likely to be 
retained by the firms to generate a return on their investment rather than passed along to the 
drivers.  As the technology is unlikely to have changed the underlying type of labor hired (the 
educational level of the workforce did not change, indicating that it neither required additional 
skills nor fewer skills), there should be little change in wage inequality.  One caveat is that wages 
could have increased to compensate drivers for the disutility of being actively monitored.  While 
this is theoretically possible, since the 1930s drivers have been monitored ex post through paper 
log books, which means there was not likely to be any compensating differential paid for the 
disamenity of real-time monitoring. 
  In a series of papers Kambourov and Manovskii (2008, 2009a, 2009b) find that 
occupational-specific human capital is the most important part of human capital (compared to 
firm-specific and industry-specific). When mobility patterns of a labor markets change in a way 
that results in the acquisition of less occupation-specific human capital, occupation mobility has 
the potential to alter within-occupation wage inequality.  However, the share of people entering, 
leaving and staying the trucking occupation in the period that we are studying is relatively stable 
(after controlling for the business cycle) which means that occupational mobility is likely not a 
big concern within truck driving. 
  The final two factors are the minimum wage and deunionization.  While truck drivers are 
not directly covered by many provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act their effective hourly 
wages cannot be below the federal minimum wage. We address this by including a measure of 
the federal minimum wage in our regression analysis.  Finally, compensation patterns differ   9 
between union and non-union truck drivers. Therefore, the deunionization that followed the 
deregulation of the industry has the potential to alter wage inequality of truck drivers. We 
address this by analyzing the evolution of wage inequality for both a union and non-union 
subsample.  We also include a measure of union density in our regression analysis. 
 
III.  Data 
We use data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistic in its Current Population Survey 
(CPS) Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG) files.
1
Earlier studies analyzing trends in wage inequality also used the March CPS (an annual 
supplement available from 1963-2004) and added the May CPS files to the ORG files. We solely 
rely on the ORG files due to larger sample sizes and the lower measurement error pointed out by 
Lemieux (2006). 
 The survey is structured such that individuals are 
interviewed for four months, exit the sample for eight months, then are interviewed again for 
four months.  During the last month of each “stay,” earnings data is collected and merged into 
the annual ORG files. Our analysis uses the files from 1979 through 2009.  
 The variables used are the hourly real wage, educational attainment, labor market 
experience (age-education-6), gender, union coverage, race, and region. Six sub-samples are 
constructed: all employed males, all truck drivers
2
                                                 
1 The data files were obtained from the NBER Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups files. 
, unionized truck drivers, non-unionized truck 
drivers, truck drivers employed in the trucking industry (for-hire), and truck drivers employed 
outside of the trucking industry (private carriage). All subsamples are restricted to individuals 
age 16-65 years and employed full time (35 or more hours per week).  The appendix  presents 
2 As females comprise less than three percent of the sample of truck drivers, we restrict our sample to males.   10 
descriptive statistics on earnings, education, experience, and union coverage for each 
subsample.
3
In the following sections we document the evolution of wage inequality between the 
economy-wide male sample and truckers and within the subsamples of truck drivers. We use 
three measures of wage inequality: the difference in log wages between the 90
th and 10
th 
percentiles of the wage distribution in a given year and, similarly, the 90-50 (upper half), and 50-
10 (lower half) log percentile differences. These differences can be roughly interpreted as the 
percentage difference in wages between the two respective points in the wage distribution. We 
also examine changes in overall wage inequality and residual wage inequality, where the latter 
measures inequality in the distribution of residuals obtained from regressing log wages on three 
educational dummies (high school, some college, college and more), a quadratic in experience, a 
full set of interactions between education and experience, dummy variables for black and other 
races, and a set of regional dummies. 
' 
IV.  Overall Wage Inequality 
IV.A.  Males Economy-wide vs. Truck Drivers 
Figure 1 displays the trend in overall wage inequality as shown by the 90-10 percentile 
difference over the data period for the economy-wide male sample and truck drivers. The pattern 
for the economy-wide males is consistent with earlier studies. Wage inequality rises considerably 
from the early 1980s to the middle 1990s as found by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008).  The 
pattern of wage inequality for truck drivers (also Figure 1) is very different from the economy-
wide male sample. Though in the very beginning of the sample period wage inequality of truck 
                                                 
3 For a detailed description of the data please consult Autor et al. (2008) We follow their data construction except that we use the MORG data 
provided at NBER.org.   11 
drivers appears to have increased, the graph provides evidence the wage inequality has decreased 
ever since.  
FIGURES 1-3 HERE 
 
Figure 1 provides support for the hypothesis that the time pattern of wage inequality for truck 
drivers is substantially different than males economy-wide. Figures 2 and 3 further demonstrate 
this contrast.  The 50-10 percentile differential is relatively stable for both groups after the mid-
1980s.  The increase in inequality across the male sample is largely driven by the 90-50 
percentile differential, while inequality at the upper end of the distribution decreased for truck 
drivers.  This latter finding is not surprising, given that the increased competition following 
deregulation should have primarily affected drivers at the upper end of the distribution, who 
were more likely to have been receiving rents during regulation.    
  As discussed in section II, the segments of the labor market sharing in the regulatory 
rents can be defined by both union membership and industry. 
IV.B.  Union vs. Non-Union 
The trend in mean wages for union members (see appendix) follows that of drivers as a 
whole: a decline in mean hourly earnings through the mid-1990s and wages slightly decreasing 
from 1996-2007.  Mean wages for nonunion drivers are stable/slightly increasing over the period 
of study.  This finding at the mean supports the earlier findings of Hirsch (1988) that unionized 
drivers felt the largest impacts of deregulation's impact on the trucking labor market. 
Moving from the mean wages to the distribution of wages, Figure 4a continues the 
analysis of the 90-10 log-wage differential by comparing unionized and non-unionized truckers. 
Segments of the trucking sector (mostly grocery, car haul, and some less-than-truckload and   12 
package express) remain heavily unionized, thus different trends in wage inequality can be 
expected between unionized and non-unionized truck drivers. Due to inconsistency in measuring 
union membership before 1983, we limit the sample range to 1983-2007.  
FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
Figures 4b and c show wage inequality for non-unionized drivers declining through the mid-
1990s and stable thereafter.  This trend is solely attributable to declines in inequality in the upper 
half of the wage distribution, while inequality appears to have increased from 1995-2007 for 
drivers in the bottom half of the distribution.  
  The pattern for unionized drivers looks different and its volatility makes it impossible to 
draw conclusions regarding trends simply by examining the overall ratios.  
IV.C.  For Hire vs. Private Carriage 
Another factor that could confound the findings for the sample of all truck drivers is the 
fact that for-hire drivers and private carriage drivers are in distinctly different segments of 
trucking services.  As discussed earlier, the initial regulations facing private carriage and for-hire 
segments were markedly different and, based on prior research, we would expect the labor 
markets to react differently to deregulation and subsequent changes to the occupation.  Simply 
looking at the means, however, shows that both groups had similar wage patterns, with wages 
decreasing through the mid-1990s and increasing from 1996 through 2007 (see appendix). 
Figure 5a presents the inequality analysis using the 90-10 log-wage differential to 
contrasting for-hire and private carriage drivers. The results are very interesting. While Figure 5a 
displaying the 90-10 differential suggests a similar trend in wage inequality for both groups of   13 
drivers, Figures 5b and 5c show that merely looking at the whole wage distribution does hides 
some potentially important facts.   
FIGURE 5 HERE 
Figure 5b shows a convergence in wage inequality in the upper-half of the wage 
distribution for private carriage and for-hire drivers, driven by an increase in wage inequality 
among for-hire drivers and a decrease in wage inequality among private carriage drivers.  This 
change seems consistent with increased competition in the for-hire segment of trucking services. 
Figure 5c also provides evidence that wage inequality converged between these groups at the 
lower end of the distribution, however this appears to be driven by decreased wage dispersion 
among for-hire drivers. 
 
V.  Residual wage inequality 
As the prior section examines the trends in hourly wages with no controls for individual 
characteristics, it is logically extended by examining whether changes in worker characteristics 
post-deregulation are driving the changes in wage distribution.  After estimating a wage equation 
controlling for education, experience, race and region, the 90
th, 50
th and 10
th log residuals are 
calculated for each year.  
Between-group inequality, typically measured as the difference in earnings of college and 
high-school educated workers, is not measured for our study. As the majority of truck drivers 
have high school diploma at their terminal level of education, little would be gained by 
examining the returns to college versus high school. 
Figures 6a-c show that residual inequality of truck drivers has a similar pattern to the 
unadjusted inequality (figures 1-3).   Residual inequality of union and non-union truck drivers   14 
are compared in Figures 7a-c. The series behave in similar ways until around 2000, when 
inequality among unionized truck drivers fell. As Figure 7c indicates this decrease seems to have 
been driven by the decrease in inequality of unionized truck drivers in the lower half of the wage 
distribution.   In all, the patterns of wage inequality in Figures 7a-7c resemble those of Figures 
4a-4c, though slightly more muted, indicating that workers characteristics accounted for some of 
the trends in inequality, but the overall findings of decreased inequality at the upper end of the 
distribution and increased inequality at lower end of the distribution holds for nonunion truck 
drivers. 
FIGURES 6-8 HERE 
Figures 8a-c compare wage inequality measures between private carriage and for-hire 
drivers. Differences before 2000 were mostly in levels but after 2000 the data indicates a 
convergence between the groups, driven by a decrease in wage inequality in the upper half of the 
distribution for for-hire drivers and an increase in wage inequality in the lower half of the 
distribution of private carriage drivers. 
These stand in contrast to Figures 5a-c.  Without controlling individual characteristics, it 
appeared that 90-10 inequality increased for both for-hire and private carriage drivers through 
the mid 1990s and then declined thereafter.  The residual analysis shows declining inequality in 
the for-hire segment.  This masks the an increase in 90-50 differential through the mid-1990s and 
decrease thereafter.   The lower end of the distribution saw a decrease in inequality over the 
entire period.  The overall trend is what we would expect in the for-hire segment of the industry, 
as it became much more competitive following deregulation.   15 
The stable 90-10 residual differentials in private carriage conform to our expectations, 
however, they mask an increase in 50-10 inequality, which cannot be readily explained by 
changes in industry structure prompted by deregulation.     
 
VI.  Institutional Explanations 
Apart from skill-biased technological change how much did institutional changes affect 
the evolution of wage inequality of truck drivers? We are trying to provide a preliminary answer 
in this section. Card and DiNardo (2002) maintain that the falling real value of the minimum 
wage, especially in the 1980s, was a major cause of increased wage inequality. Autor at al. 
(2005) weaken this claim by showing that the real value of the minimum wage is also 
statistically correlated with the development of wage inequality in the upper half of the wage 
distribution, which is counterintuitive.  
In this section we regress the overall 90-10, 90-50, and 50-10 percentile difference of the 
log real wage on the real value of the federal minimum wage, a measure of economy-wide union 
coverage
4
We also include a time trend and an indicator variable for years after 1991. We include the post-
1991 dummy variable since Autor et al. (2008) provide evidence of a slow-down in skill-biased 
technological change after 1992 in their analysis. We run the regression for every subsample 
using all years (1979-2009) available and for both overall and residual inequality.   
, the coefficient of variation for education, the coefficient of variation for experience. 
VI.A. Overall Inequality Regressions 
Table 1a reports the results for the 90-10 percentile difference in log real wages. While 
the real value of the federal minimum wage has the expected sign for the sample of all workers, 
it is statistically insignificant for all other subsamples.  This is not surprising for truck drivers; 
                                                 
4 Since there is no data for 1982 we interpolate.   16 
they are not explicitly covered by the provisions of the Fair Labor Standard Act and though their 
employers are bound by the federal minimum wage law, there are few official complaints of 
trucking firms paying less than the minimum wage. 
The union coverage variable yields mixed results. While the sign of the effect is largely 
negative, as expected, it is positive and statistically significant in the sample of union drivers.  It 
is important to note that union density decreased substantially over the time period in question.  
For truck drivers overall, this resulted in less wage inequality, however, the increased wage 
dispersion among union truck drivers is likely caused by the fact that the contracts for more 
recent union drivers are not as lucrative as those who have been drivers since the early 1980s, 
leading to increased inequality within this subsample. 
While the coefficient of variation of education yields negative and significant results for 
the 90-10 differential across all workers and all male workers, there is no significant effect for 
truck drivers or any of the driver subsamples.  This is logical as the occupation is dominated by 
those with a high school education and there are little returns for additional education.  A similar 
result is found with respect to the coefficient of variation of experience.  It is positive and 
significant for the overall and all male samples, but not significant for any of the truck driving 
subsamples. 
Assuming that the time trend proxies for SBTC, we find little evidence of SBTC for truck 
drivers, contrasting sharply with the positive and significant coefficient for the overall sample.  
For the sample of truck drivers and the sample of for-hire truck drivers we actually find a 
statistically significant downward trend in overall 90-10 wage inequality. 
TABLE 1 HERE   17 
Tables 1b-c repeat the regression analysis for the upper (2b) and lower (2c) half of the 
wage distribution. The results for the 90-50 differential are similar to those found for the whole 
distribution but the analysis of the lower half of the distribution shows that institutional 
explanations are not likely to have played a large role in the evolution of overall wage inequality 
in the trucking sector. Autor et al. (2008) showed that the real value of the federal minimum 
wage and unionization help explain both the evolution of wage inequality in both the upper and 
lower half of the wage distribution. They use this as evidence against institution explanations. 
Our regression results provide further evidence for this conjecture. Tables 1b and 1c show that 
the two variables are only jointly significant for the 90-50 differential but not in explaining the 
evolution of wage inequality in the lower half of the wage distribution.  
Finally, Appendix B presents regression results with the 90-50-10 wage percentiles as the 
dependent variables, rather than the wage ratios.  For truck drivers the effect of union coverage is 
highest at the median and below.  We see a similar result for coefficient of variation in 
experience, with higher variation having a larger absolute impact at the lower deciles. 
VI.B.  Residual Inequality Regressions 
Tables 2a-c repeat the above regression analysis for our measures of residual wage 
inequality. The results are very similar to those obtained using overall inequality measures as 
dependent variables.  The real value of the federal minimum wage and union membership are 
jointly significant for the economy-wide and all-male samples, using the 90-10 difference as the 
dependent variable, but not for any of the trucking subsamples. The results summarized in Tables 
2b and 2c, however, again show that the results are driven by the effect of the institutional 
variables on the upper half of the residual wage distribution providing further evidence for an 
institutional explanation of wage inequality.    18 
TABLE 2 HERE 
In summary we can state again that the influence of institutional factors like the real 
value of the federal minimum wage and union coverage have a markedly different influence 
among truck drivers than in the economy as a whole.  
VII.  Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the evolution of wage inequality of U.S. truck drivers, comparing 
this labor market to economy-wide trends for employed males. The analysis showed that wage 
inequality evolved in a very different manner compared to the economy as a whole. While wage 
inequality in the whole economy increased during the sample period (1979-2009), the same 
measures for truck drivers show no such increase. On the contrary, this paper provided evidence 
that wage inequality for truck drivers has decreased for some sub-groups. This is true for the 
measures of overall, between-group and within-group inequality. We also find little evidence that 
the structure of truck drivers wages responds to institutional factors like the real value of the 
federal minimum wage or union coverage.  
These findings are in line with the notion that skill-biased technological change was the 
main driving force behind the changes in the U.S. wage structure since the trucking industry has 
not experienced innovations in the last 25 years that would result in an increase in the relative 
demand for skilled versus unskilled labor.  It also provides evidence for the argument that 
trucking deregulation created a more competitive labor market with a decrease in wage 
dispersion, as those labor groups that were able to extract rents during the regulatory period were 
no longer able to maintain their wage advantages in the post-deregulation period.  This is 
particularly evident with the compression of wages at the upper end of the distribution that 
occurred within the unionized and for-hire segments of the labor force, both sectors that   19 
experienced rents during regulation.  Somewhat surprising is that the nonunion and private 
carriage segments (who did not receive rents during regulation) have experienced increased in 
wage inequality at the lower end of the wage distribution, which cannot be explained by changes 
in worker or economic characteristics.     20 
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Fig. 8c: 50-10 Residual Truckers: For Hire vs. Priv. Carriage 
 
Table 1a: OLS-Regression of the Overall 90-10 Differential 
   All  All-Male  Truckers  Union  Non-Union  For-Hire  Private 
                                            
Real Value of Fed. Min. 
Wage 
-0.029  **  -0.008     0.016     0.021     -0.016     0.005     -0.023    
-(2.03)     -(0.41)     (0.95)     (0.52)     -(0.89)     (0.17)     -(0.85)    
                                            
Union Coverage  -0.006     -0.019  *  -0.017  **  0.036  *  0.0004     -0.028  ***  -0.006    
-(0.57)     -(1.71)     -(2.34)     (1.69)     (0.05)     -(2.62)     -(0.67)    
                                            
Year  0.007  *  0.003     -0.012  ***  0.011     -0.005     -0.023  ***  -0.003    
(1.86)     (0.64)     -(3.18)     (1.55)     -(1.62)     -(3.34)     -(0.55)    
                                            
Year>=1992  0.00001     -0.00002     -0.00001     0.00003     -0.00002  *  0.00002     -0.00002    
(0.50)     -(0.89)     -(0.40)     (1.17)     -(1.92)     (1.44)     -(1.62)    
                             
 
           
Coeff. Var. Edu  -1.963  **  -1.059     0.106     -0.875     1.807     1.274     -0.845    
-(1.96)     -(1.07)     (0.07)     -(1.32)     (1.19)     (1.02)     -(0.64)    
                                            
Coeff. Var. Exp  0.458  ***  0.325  **  0.034     0.006     -0.013     0.005     0.003    
(4.23)     (2.48)     (1.44)     (0.59)     -(0.65)     (0.23)     (0.12)    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis I  0.001  ***  0.061  *  0.295     0.395     0.441     0.455     0.812    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis II  0.014  **  0.030  **  0.081  *  0.130     0.676     0.003  ***  0.199    
  
 
                                      
R-Squared  0.928     0.895     0.712     0.261     0.613     0.589     0.515    
 
 
*,**,** = significant at the 10%, 5% and  1% level respectively. Joint Hypothesis I test for the joint significance of both coefficients of variation, Joint Hypothesis II 
tests for the joint significance of the real value of the minimum wage and Union Coverage.     27 
 
Table 1b: OLS-Regression of the Overall 90-50 Differential 
   All  All-Male  Truckers  Union  Non-Union  For-Hire  Private 
                                            
Real Value of Fed. 
Min. Wage 
-0.023  ***  -0.005     0.029  **  -0.005     -0.024  *  0.002     -0.011    
-(3.36)     -(0.54)     (2.29)     -(0.29)     -(1.82)     (0.10)     -(0.54)    
                                            
Union Coverage  0.000     -0.006     -0.022  ***  0.013  *  0.005     -0.032  ***  -0.0003    
-(0.01)     -(1.00)     -(2.70)     (1.79)     (0.76)     -(3.10)     -(0.04)    
                                            
Year  0.006  ***  0.006  ***  -0.013  ***  0.007  ***  -0.001     -0.015  ***  -0.002    
(3.09)     (3.08)     -(3.53)     (2.70)     -(0.52)     -(2.71)     -(0.52)    
                                            
Year>=1992  0.00002  *  -0.0000037     -0.0000011     -0.00001     0.00001     0.00004  ***  0.0000001    
(1.68)     -(0.46)     -(0.12)     -(0.37)     (1.15)     (3.43)     (0.01)    
                                            
Coeff. Var. Edu  -1.112     0.241     -0.085     -0.321     -0.609     -0.235     -1.238    
-(1.34)     (0.39)     -(0.08)     -(0.79)     -(0.58)     -(0.35)     -(1.47)    
                                            
Coeff. Var. Exp  0.153  **  0.073     0.029     0.000     -0.005     -0.004     0.010    
(2.44)     (1.13)     (1.62)     -(0.04)     -(0.30)     -(0.34)     (0.54)    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis I  0.067  *  0.448     0.238     0.729     0.798     0.770     0.231    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis II  0.010  ***  0.294     0.039  **  0.108     0.213     0.000  ***  0.738    
  
 
                                      
R-Squared  0.971     0.970     0.743     0.276     0.749     0.739     0.634    
*,**,** = significant at the 10%, 5% and  1% level respectively. Joint Hypothesis I test for the joint significance of both coefficients of variation, Joint Hypothesis II 
tests for the joint significance of the real value of the minimum wage and Union Coverage.     28 
 
Table 1c: OLS-Regression of the Overall 50-10 Differential 
   All  All-Male  Truckers  Union  Non-Union  For-Hire  Private 
                                            
Real Value of Fed. Min. 
Wage 
-0.007     -0.002     -0.013     0.025     0.008     0.003     -0.013    
-(0.55)     -(0.18)     -(0.92)     (0.76)     (0.86)     (0.12)     -(1.03)    
                                            
Union Coverage  -0.006     -0.013     0.005     0.022     -0.005     0.004     -0.006    
-(0.65)     -(1.60)     (0.98)     (1.14)     -(0.75)     (0.33)     -(1.02)    
                                            
Year  0.001     -0.003     0.001     0.004     -0.004     -0.008     -0.001    
(0.35)     -(1.05)     (0.18)     (0.54)     -(1.32)     -(1.36)     -(0.26)    
                                            
Year>=1992  -0.00001     -0.00001     -0.00001     0.00004  *  -0.00003  ***  -0.00002  **  -0.00002  ** 
-(1.25)     -(0.81)     -(0.47)     (1.79)     -(3.88)     -(2.19)     -(2.36)    
                             
 
           
Coeff. Var. Edu  -0.851     -1.300     0.190     -0.554     2.416  **  1.509     0.394    
-(0.94)     -(1.35)     (0.24)     -(0.89)     (1.97)     (1.59)     (0.52)    
                                            
Coeff. Var. Exp  0.305  ***  0.252  **  0.005     0.007     -0.008     0.008     -0.007    
(3.62)     (2.57)     (0.29)     (0.86)     -(0.63)     (0.46)     -(0.58)    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis I  0.005  ***  0.045  **  0.933     0.506     0.077  *  0.182     0.756    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis II  0.214     0.149     0.581     0.229     0.654     0.842     0.110    
  
 
                                      
R-Squared  0.607     0.545     0.220     0.339     0.350     0.674     0.300    
 
*,**,** = significant at the 10%, 5% and  1% level respectively. Joint Hypothesis I test for the joint significance of both coefficients of variation, Joint Hypothesis II 
tests for the joint significance of the real value of the minimum wage and Union Coverage. 
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Table 2a: OLS-Regression of the Residual 90-10 Differential 
   All  All-Male  Truckers  Union  Non-Union  For-Hire  Private 
                                            
Real Value of Fed. 
Min. Wage 
-0.018  ***  -0.015  *  -0.016     0.029     -0.025  *  -0.006     -0.023    
-(2.74)     -(1.76)     -(1.11)     (0.76)     -(1.88)     -(0.16)     -(1.17)    
                                            
Union Coverage  -0.008  **  -0.006     -0.005     0.016     -0.002     -0.017     0.004    
-(2.16)     -(1.20)     -(0.89)     (0.78)     -(0.23)     -(1.49)     (0.52)    
                                            
Year  0.005  ***  0.004  *  -0.005  **  0.001     -0.002     -0.015  *  0.004    
(2.68)     (1.66)     -(1.98)     (0.18)     -(0.69)     -(1.80)     (1.08)    
                                            
Year>=1992  -0.00003  ***  -0.00003  ***  -0.00003  ***  0.00001     -0.00002  **  -0.00001     -0.00004  *** 
-(6.75)     -(4.78)     -(3.35)     (0.59)     -(2.31)     -(0.50)     -(3.95)    




                       
Coeff. Var. Edu  -1.388  ***  -1.908  ***  1.726  *  -0.520     1.421     1.417     0.898    
-(5.60)     -(4.43)     (1.70)     -(0.89)     (1.36)     (0.90)     (0.91)    
                                            
Coeff. Var. Exp  0.387  ***  0.356  ***  0.005     -0.010     -0.018     -0.016     -0.011    
(6.64)     (4.93)     (0.26)     -(0.78)     -(1.20)     -(0.71)     -(0.59)    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis I  0.000  ***  0.000  ***  0.154     0.550     0.318     0.648     0.554    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis II  0.001  ***  0.023  **  0.096  *  0.303     0.102     0.026  **  0.408    
  
 
                                      
R-Squared  0.947     0.881     0.595     0.429     0.451     0.480     0.349    
 
*,**,** = significant at the 10%, 5% and  1% level respectively. Joint Hypothesis I test for the joint significance of both coefficients of variation, Joint Hypothesis II 
tests for the joint significance of the real value of the minimum wage and Union Coverage.     30 
Table 2b: OLS-Regression of the Residual 90-50 Differential 
   All  All-Male  Truckers  Union  Non-Union  For-Hire  Private 
                                            
Real Value of Fed. 
Min. Wage 
-0.004     -0.005     -0.001     0.026     -0.008     -0.016     -0.002    
-(1.33)     -(0.93)     -(0.10)     (1.57)     -(0.54)     -(1.20)     -(0.11)    
                                            
Union Coverage  -0.002     -0.004     -0.006     -0.004     0.000     -0.011  *  0.000    
-(1.09)     -(1.19)     -(1.31)     -(0.41)     -(0.07)     -(1.81)     -(0.03)    
                                            
Year  0.004  ***  0.003  ***  -0.006  **  -0.001     -0.002     -0.009  **  0.001    
(4.68)     (2.75)     -(2.47)     -(0.30)     -(0.87)     -(2.11)     (0.17)    
                                            
Year>=1992  -0.00001  ***  -0.00001  ***  -0.00002  **  -0.00002     -0.00001     0.00001     -0.00002  *** 
-(5.50)     -(3.39)     -(2.28)     -(1.58)     -(1.42)     (1.00)     -(3.13)    
                                            
Coeff. Var. Edu  -0.942  ***  -1.451  ***  1.346     0.015     0.592     0.490     0.340    
-(4.98)     -(5.14)     (1.58)     (0.04)     (0.68)     (0.67)     (0.41)    
                                            
Coeff. Var. Exp  0.185  ***  0.179  ***  0.008     -0.018  ***  -0.010     0.008     -0.009    
(6.98)     (4.75)     (0.49)     -(4.00)     -(0.98)     (0.63)     -(0.52)    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis I  0.000  ***  0.000  ***  0.169     0.003  ***  0.586     0.480     0.773    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis II  0.109     0.076  *  0.203     0.272     0.774     0.000  ***  0.972    
  
 
                                      
R-Squared  0.954     0.916     0.515     0.399     0.555     0.478     0.257    
  
 
                                      
 
*,**,** = significant at the 10%, 5% and  1% level respectively. Joint Hypothesis I test for the joint significance of both coefficients of variation, Joint Hypothesis II 
tests for the joint significance of the real value of the minimum wage and Union Coverage.     31 
 
Table 2c: OLS-Regression of the Residual 50-10 Differential 
   All  All-Male  Truckers  Union  Non-Union  For-Hire  Private 
                                            
Real Value of Fed. 
Min. Wage 
-0.013  ***  -0.011  **  -0.015     0.003     -0.018  **  0.010     -0.021  ** 
-(3.40)     -(2.37)     -(1.52)     (0.09)     -(1.96)     (0.40)     -(2.32)    
                                            
Union Coverage  -0.006  ***  -0.003     0.001     0.020     -0.002     -0.006     0.005    
-(2.62)     -(0.99)     (0.14)     (1.21)     -(0.34)     -(0.62)     (1.05)    
                                            
Year  0.0007     0.0002     0.0004     0.0024     0.0002     -0.0060     0.0035  * 
(0.70)     (0.21)     (0.17)     (0.39)     (0.08)     -(1.03)     (1.75)    
                                            
Year>=1992  -0.00002  ***  -0.00002  ***  -0.00002  **  0.00003  *  -0.00001     -0.00002     -0.00002  ** 
-(6.51)     -(5.46)     -(2.09)     (1.72)     -(1.21)     -(1.36)     -(2.13)    
                                            
Coeff. Var. Edu  -0.446  ***  -0.456  **  0.380     -0.535     0.830     0.927     0.558    
-(3.07)     -(2.21)     (0.57)     -(0.81)     (1.22)     (0.89)     (0.95)    
                                            
Coeff. Var. Exp  0.202  ***  0.177  ***  -0.003     0.008     -0.008     -0.024  *  -0.002    
(5.78)     (4.57)     -(0.21)     (0.70)     -(0.79)     -(1.65)     -(0.18)    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis I  0.000  ***  0.000  ***  0.807     0.512     0.336     0.266     0.564    
                                            
P-value of Joint 
Hypothesis II  0.000  ***  0.009  ***  0.160     0.305     0.080  *  0.800     0.050  * 
  
 
                                      
R-Squared  0.938     0.876     0.343     0.427     0.430     0.494     0.493    
 
*,**,** = significant at the 10%, 5% and  1% level respectively. Joint Hypothesis I test for the joint significance of both coefficients of variation, Joint Hypothesis II 




Appendix: Descriptive Statistics on the Full Sample and Subsamples  









year  1983  2009  1983  2009  1983  2009  1983  2009  1983  2009  1983  2009  1983  2009 
Obs. 
   
122,045   1874 
      
65,126  
      
47,792   2634  1874  878  280  1756  1594  816  569  1818  1305 
Real Wage  1220.45  13.28  13.38  13.54  12.40  12.32  11.99  12.18  10.78  10.52  10.49  10.64  10.39  10.59 
Experience  15.02  21.94  15.17  18.87  16.98  21.94  20.37  24.61  15.20  21.46  19.49  24.42  15.74  20.62 
High School  0.38  0.54  0.36  0.28  0.52  0.54  0.56  0.55  0.50  0.54  0.51  0.58  0.53  0.52 
Some College  0.10  0.27  0.09  0.27  0.06  0.27  0.06  0.28  0.07  0.26  0.07  0.24  0.06  0.28 
College  0.24  0.05  0.25  0.35  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.07  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.05  0.02  0.06 
Male  0.58  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Union  0.24  0.15  0.27  0.14  0.34  0.15  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.45  0.11  0.29  0.17 
 
 Appendix B: OLS Regression: Wage Percentile as Dependent Variable 
   Full Sample  Truckers 
   90th  50th  10th  90th  50th  10th 
                                      
Real Value of 
Fed. Min. 
Wage 
-0.016     0.006     0.013     -0.002     -0.032  **  -0.019    
-(1.35)     (0.58)     (1.06)     -(0.18)     -(2.03)     -(0.97)    
                                      
Union 
Coverage 
-0.003     -0.003     0.003     0.024  ***  0.046  ***  0.041  *** 
-(0.42)     -(0.48)     (0.33)     (3.80)     (5.60)     (5.82)    
                                      
Year  0.014  ***  0.009  ***  0.007  **  0.015  ***  0.028  ***  0.028  *** 
(5.05)     (3.96)     (2.31)     (5.02)     (7.44)     (6.12)    
                                      
Year>=1992  -0.000005     -0.00002  ***  -0.00001     -0.00001     -0.00001     -0.000004    
-(0.35)     -(2.92)     -(0.89)     -(0.82)     -(0.63)     -(0.22)    
                                    * 
Coeff. Var. 
Edu 
-1.863  *  -0.751     0.100     -1.549  *  -1.465     -1.655    
-(1.67)     -(0.92)     (0.09)     -(1.72)     -(1.16)     -(0.99)    
                                      
Coeff. Var. 
Exp 
-0.180  **  -0.333  ***  -0.637  ***  -0.061  ***  -0.089  ***  -0.095  *** 
-(2.06)     -(4.87)     -(7.42)     -(3.97)     -(4.05)     -(3.98)    
                                      
P-value of 
Joint 
Hypothesis I  0.016  **  0.000  ***  0.000  ***  0.002  ***  0.002  ***  0.001  *** 
                                      
P-value of 
Joint 
Hypothesis II  0.319     0.824     0.303     0.000  ***  0.000  ***  0.000  *** 
                                      
R-Squared  0.980     0.939     0.906     0.786     0.842     0.809    
 